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THE INSTITUTIONAL GOOD FAITH TEST FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF AN INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
SUMMONS: United States v. LaSalle National Bank
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Service is charged with the responsi-
bility of inquiring into and ascertaining the tax liability of all
persons.' Pursuant to this pervasive inquisitorial duty, the Serv-
ice has the power to demand that a taxpayer or third party pro-
duce any information deemed relevant or material to any tax
investigation .2
The purposes for which the summons power may be used are
ostensibly limited by the language of section 7602. 3 Nevertheless,
the parameters of that power have been the subject of incessant
litigation.' The Internal Revenue Service seems determined to
expand the scope of its summons power beyond the statutory
language. Taxpayers and third parties seem equally determined
to resist enforcement whenever and however possible.
In the judicial arena, the need for a swift and effective tax
collection system has prevailed. The Supreme Court has consis-
I.R.C. § 7601(a). Historically, this section was not used to interpret the scope of the
summons power under § 7602. The Supreme Court, however, has recently used the lan-
guage of both sections to determine the extent of the summons authority. See United
States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 149 (1975). The result is a vastly expanded summons
power. Id. at 153-56 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Congress reacted to the specific holding in
Bisceglia by placing explicit limits on the use of the summons power when the name of
the taxpayer is unknown. See I.R.C. § 7609(f).
I.R.C. § 7602(2). The Service is authorized to issue a summons to:
the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or
employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person
liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named
in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data,
and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to
such inquiry ....
3 I.R.C. § 7602 authorizes use of the summons for the following purposes:
ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has
been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any
person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liabil-
ity . .. .
'See Kramon, FEDERAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS: SOME CURRENT
PROBLEMS, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 625, 641-42 (1970).
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tently whittled away the substantive defenses against enforce-
ment of a summons until only the nebulous concept of improper
purpose retains viability as a basis for successful resistance. 5
Within this category, the criminal purpose defense has been the
most frequently invoked objection to enforcement of a summons.'
The essence of the criminal purpose defense is that an Inter-
nal Revenue Service summons may not be used solely to gather
evidence of criminal tax violations. The utility of the defense,
however, was severely restricted by the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. LaSalle National Bank. SIn LaSalle, the Court
held that a summons must be issued in good faith prior to a
recommendation for prosecution from the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice to the Justice Department.' Furthermore, the subjective in-
tent of an Internal Revenue Service agent is not determinative of
sole criminal purpose; the proper test is institutional good faith.9
While purporting to preserve a good faith test for enforcibil-
ity, the Court effectively disposed of the issue by requiring the
party attacking the summons to prove that no valid civil tax
purpose existed." Thus, from a practical standpoint, the criminal
purpose defense will not bar enforcement of a summons unless the
Service has formally recommended criminal prosecution of the
taxpayer. This conclusion as to the current status of the criminal
purpose defense is derived from an analysis of (1) the evolution
of the defense, (2) the compromise holding of LaSalle, (3) the
soundness of the rationale, and (4) the institutional good faith
test.
I See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (taxpayer lacks any
fourth amendment interest in third-party summons; no reasonable expectation of privacy
in bank records); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402, 404, 414 (1976) (attorney must
produce workpapers of taxpayer's accountant; such production in compliance with sum-
mons is not barred by any fifth amendment privilege of the taxpayer or by any attorney-
client privilege); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973) (no fourth or fifth
amendment bar to production of taxpayer's records by accountant); cf. Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (absent custodial interrogation, taxpayer has no
right to Miranda warnings before interview by tax agents even where the possibility of
criminal prosecution exists).
6 For general discussions of the criminal purpose defense, see Van Wert, Tax Frauds
and the Government's Right of Access to Taypayer's Books and Records, 5 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 403 (1978); Stroud, The Criminal Prosecution Defense: A Defense to a Section 7602
Summons?, 4 AM. J. CRiM. LAW 152 (1975-76).
See text accompanying notes 24-38 infra.
98 S. Ct. 2357 (1978).
Id. at 2366.
10 Id. at 2367-68 & n.19.
" Id. at 2367.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRIMINAL PURPOSE DEFENSE
The criminal purpose theory originated in United States v.
O'Connor, 2 a lower court case in which the taxpayer's accountant
successfully argued that a summons issued in aid of a criminal
prosecution should not be enforced. 3 At least one purpose of the
summons, issued by a special agent whose assigned investigation
of the taxpayer had been completed, was to secure specific infor-
mation about the sources of the taxpayer's income for use by the
Justice Department in a criminal case then pending against the
taxpayer." The court held that under the circumstances enforce-
ment of the summons would be contrary to public policy.'5 The
rationale of the court was that the statute limited the purposes
for which the summons could be used, Congress had not granted
unlimited administrative agency power for pretrial discovery in
criminal cases, and such power historically was vested in the
grand jury."6
In Boren v. Tucker, '7 the criminal purpose objection was sub-
sequently raised as a defense against enforcement of a summons
issued by a special agent to a corporation in an investigation into
the individual tax liability of its officers. Although issuance by a
special agent implied that criminal charges were being consid-
ered,' 8 the lower court ordered enforcement and held the taxpay-
ers in civil contempt for their refusal to comply." On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit held that the mere possibility of criminal prosecu-
tion did not invalidate the summons because the actual amount
' 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass 1953).
,s Although O'Connor interpreted § 3614 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 438,
it has been consistently cited by the Court in § 7602 cases. See, e.g., Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517, 533 (1971).
" 118 F. Supp. at 249-50. O'Connor did not bar use of the summons only if its sole
purpose was that of gathering information for a criminal prosecution; in fact, the court
explicitly acknowledged the civil nature of the investigation and then refused to enforce
the summons because one of the purposes was to aid a criminal prosecution. See, id. at
250; Van Wert, supra note 2, at 415-16.
118 F. Supp. at 250.
Id. at 250-51.
' Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1957).
" Determination and investigation of civil tax liability is normally the function of a
revenue agent, whereas a special agent is responsible "for the development of evidence
pertaining to the potential criminal features of the case and the ad valorem additions to
the tax .... " 5 INT. REv. MAN. - AD. (CCH) § 9324.2, at 28,080 (11-78). Thus, issuance
of a summons by a special agent is an indication that a criminal investigation is under
way.
,9 239 F.2d at 768-69.
1979
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of tax due varies with the presence or absence of fraud30 While
agreeing in theory with the O'Connor holding, the court neverthe-
less distinguished it on its facts.2
Within their respective factual contexts, O'Connor and
Boren are analytically sound decisions. 2 Read together, the cases
stand for the proposition that a summons issued in aid of a
pending criminal prosecution is improper, but the mere fact that
the summons may uncover evidence of value in a future criminal
case will not preclude its enforcement if it retains a valid civil tax
purpose .23
In Reisman v. Caplin, 24 the Supreme Court stamped its im-
primatur on the criminal purpose defense. After dismissing an
appeal for an injunction to bar an Internal Revenue summons on
the grounds that an adequate remedy was provided at law,2 5 the
Court stated that "in any of these procedures . . .the witness
may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground. This
would include, as the circuits have held, the defenses that the
material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence
for use in a criminal prosecution . ... 2 By this unfortunate
choice of words, the Court implied that every use of the summons
power to investigate possible violations of criminal law was im-
proper.
Less than a year later, the Supreme Court restated the im-
proper purpose doctrine in United States v. Powell.7 The issue
in the case was what criteria should be used to determine if a
" Id. at 772 (alternative holding). If no fraud is found, the amount of tax due would
be limited to the deficiencies between the amount paid and the amount payable, if any.
However, where the deficiencies in tax are the result of fraud, an additional 50% is
assessed as a penalty. I.R.C. § 6653(b).
21 239 F.2d at 772-73.
When the facts of O'Connor and Boren are measured against the holdings of all
subsequent Supreme Court decisions relating to the criminal purpose defense, including
LaSalle, the same results obtain. See text accompanying notes 24-39, 63-71 infra.
See Comment, Taxpayer Intervention at Summary Proceedings to Enforce an In-
ternal Revenue Service Summons, 32 MD. L. REV. 143, 151 (1972).
375 U.S. 440 (1964) (unanimous decision).
Id. at 443. The adequate remedy is that in order to enforce a summons when
compliance is not forthcoming, the Internal Revenue Service must petition the District
Court to order compliance. The Court found this procedure to be sufficient protection for
the taxpayer. Id. at 445-46.
11 Id. at 449 (citing Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1956)) (emphasis
added).
379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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summons is enforceable. The Court rejected any probable cause
standard's even where assessment of ordinary tax deficiencies was
barred by the statute of limitations and the only basis for further
investigation was fraud.2 Using only a statutory analysis,30 the
Court held that the burden on the Service was four-fold: "[to]
show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legiti-
mate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose,
that the information sought is not already within [its] posses-
sion, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have
been followed . . . ,,3 Once these threshold requirements are
met,312 the summons is enforceable unless the taxpayer or third
party offers substantial evidence that the summons was issued for
an improper purpose, which the Court defined as any use of the
summons for a purpose adversely "reflecting on the good faith of
the particular investigation."ss Furthermore, utilization of the
judiciary to enforce such a summons constitutes an abuse of the
Court's process.
3 4
" Id. at 51. The actual holding contains a caveat: "the Government need make no
showing of probable cause to suspect fraud unless the taxpayer raises a substantial ques-
tion that judicial enforcement. . . would be an abusive use of the court's process .... "
Id. (emphasis added). No subsequent cases were found in which such a standard was
imposed. One situation in which the Court has implied that probable cause and a search
warrant would be required in place of a summons is where the Service seeks to obtain an
individual taxpayer's personal business records directly from him. See Andresen v. Mary-
land, 427 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1976). The importance of the caveat to the criminal purpose
defense, however, is that if the taxpayer can make a substantial showing of improper
criminal purpose, then Powell implies that the Service should be required to meet the
probable cause standard before the summons could be enforced, whether directed to the
taxpayer personally or to a third party.
" 379 U.S. at 57. The summons may still serve a noncriminal purpose because no
statute of limitations applies to civil fraud. See I.R.C. § 6501(c).
m There were no constitutional issues raised in Powell. In light of subsequent Court
decisions, there appear to be no such issues which would act as a complete bar to enforce-
ment of a third-party summons. See note 5 supra.
,1 379 U.S. at 57-58.
32 The burden placed on the Service is minimal: it is met by filing an affidavit with
the petition for enforcement alleging that each of the four requirements has been met. The
format may be virtually verbatim from the language of the Court, with the addition of
such facts as the name of the taxpayer or business under investigation. See, e.g., Donald-
son v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 520 (1971); United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co.,
572 F.2d 36, 37 (1978); cf. Miller, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE-
GATHERING: AN APPRAISAL OF THE INVESTIGATIVE POWERS OF THE IN-
TERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 6 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Rgv. 657, 680-81 (1965) (the
burden of proof of impropriety or absence of administrative requirements is on the tax-
payer or third party, not the Service).
0 379 U.S. at 58. As specific examples of bad faith, the Court cited harassment or
pressure to settle a collateral dispute.
' Id. It may be noted that in a companion case, the Powell criteria were made appli-
1979
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With the good faith element interjected into the concept of
improper purpose, the Supreme Court subsequently felt com-
pelled to clarify the ambiguous Reisman dictum.' Using the or-
ganizational structure of the Internal Revenue Service as its refer-
ence point,36 the Donaldson Court concluded that a summons is-
sued by a special agent has a dual criminal and civil purpose 7.3
To deny enforcement of such a summons would unnecessarily
hamper the legitimate investigatory power of the Service. The
Reisman dictum was restricted to pending criminal prosecutions
or investigations solely for criminal purposes.38 The Court then
formulated a two-prong test for enforcement of an Internal Reve-
nue summons: it must be "issued in good faith and prior to a
recommendation for criminal prosecution.
'3
Absent any concrete guidelines from the Court, its attempt
at clarification led only to confusion and conflict in the lower
courts revolving around two issues: (1) at what stage of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service procedure the determinative recommenda-
tion occurs,' 0 and (2) whether the criminal purpose defense raises
a question of good faith."
Courts concerned with pinpointing the exact moment when
the prohibitive recommendation occurred generally disregarded
the good faith element in the Donaldson test. The underlying
premise of these cases was that the summons could not be chal-
cable to summonses issued directly to the taxpayer as well as third parties. See Ryan v.
United States, 379 U.S. 61, 62 (1964). But see note 28 supra.
" Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531-32 (1971). Having denied the right
of the taxpayer to intervene in an enforcement proceeding against his employer, the Court
had no need to consider his substantive defense.
" d. at 534-35. Of significance to the Court was the fact that the Service is organized
in such a manner that responsibilities for civil and criminal investigations are intertwined.
'" Id. at 535. But see United States v. Friedman, 388 F. Supp. 963, 969-70 (W.D. Pa.
1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1976); Comment, Constraints on the Administrative
Summons Power of the Internal Revenue Service, 63 IOwA L. REV. 526 (1977).
" 400 U.S. at 533.
"' Id. at 536.
,0 See, e.g., United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977)
(crucial recommendation is from the Service to the Justice Department); United States
v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 624-25 (3d Cir. 1975) (determinative recommendation is within the
heirarchy of the Service; reversing district court holding that Donaldson meant a recom-
mendation from the Justice Department to the Service); United States v. Billingsley, 469
F.2d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 1972) (referral by the Service to Justice is determinative;
reversing district court holding that recommendation by special agent to his superiors
precluded enforcement).
" Compare United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1975) with United
States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1978).
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lenged on criminal purpose grounds unless prosecution was pend-
ing or had been recommended.' 2 Other courts, however, insisted
that the good faith element must be considered even if no recom-
mendation for prosecution had been made.'3
A comparison of United States v. Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co." with United States v. Wall Corp.'5 illustrates the extent of
disagreement in the lower courts. After reviewing the evolution of
the criminal purpose defense in Morgan Guaranty, the Second
Circuit Court strongly argued that Donaldson imposed an objec-
tive test for enforcement of a summons in aid of a criminal inves-
tigation: the only necessary inquiry being whether in fact a rec-
ommendation had been made for criminal prosecution.'0 In its
opinion, the good faith element was wholly inapplicable to the
issue of improper criminal purpose. 7 This interpretation is dia-
metrically opposed to the analysis of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court in the Wall Corp. case:
Our inquiry is not ended upon a determination that prosecution has
neither been instigated nor recommended, since Donaldson also re-
quires that a summons be issued "in good faith." Thus, if it can be
shown that the investigating agent had already formed a firm pur-
pose to recommend criminal prosecution even though he had not as
yet made a formal recommendation, issuance of the summons would
presumably be in bad faith. Similarly, if the civil liability were
already determined, the summons would appear to be solely for a
criminal purpose.
48
In spite of their obvious theoretical conflict, these two cases have
much in common: (1) both assumed that the good faith test
would require probing the mental processes of the special agent;4 1
(2) neither offered any real protection to the taxpayer; 50 and (3)
" See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117, 119 (8th Cir. 1971).
a E.g., United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208,
1210 (10th Cir. 1972).
44 572 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978).
- 475 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
" 572 F.2d at 41.
,1 Id. Judge Friendly argued that the good faith test should apply only to such issues
as harrassment or pressure to settle collateral disputes which were used as illustrations of
bad faith by the Powell Court. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
" 475 F.2d at 895.
" Compare 572 F.2d at 41 with 475 F.2d at 895.
1 The lower court enforcement of the summons was upheld in both cases, as was
denial of the taxpayer's request for discovery. 572 F.2d at 42-43; 475 F.2d at 895.
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the Supreme Court rejected both extremes in the LaSalle case.
III. THE COMPROMISE OF LaSalle
An Internal Revenue Service special agent issued two sum-
monses to the LaSalle National Bank for all documents and cor-
respondence pertaining to certain trusts administered by the
bank on behalf of the taxpayer.5' When the bank refused to com-
ply, the Service petitioned the district court for enforcement.2
In response, the bank invoked the criminal purpose defense as
grounds for denial of enforcement, arguing that it did not have
to establish that a particular summons could serve no civil pur-
pose, but only that the special agent's investigation was " 'solely
for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in a criminal prose-
cution.' "3
At the hearing, the special agent testified that he had specifi-
cally requested assignment to investigate the taxpayer on the
basis of information received from extraneous sources, but that
no other law enforcement agency had suggested the investiga-
tion.54 He further stated that his objective was to investigate pos-
sible criminal tax violations; that no revenue agent was jointly
assigned to the investigation; and that at the time of the enforce-
ment petition, he had not concluded that criminal charges should
be filed nor made any such recommendation to his superiors.5 5 In
its petition for enforcement, however, the Service alleged that the
documents contained information necessary to establish the civil
tax liability of the taxpayer and that the Service did not already
possess such information. 6
Although acknowledging the inherent probability that a
criminal investigation has concurrent civil tax aspects, the dis-
trict court nevertheless found that the special agent's sole inter-
est was to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution. 7 Applying
" 98 S. Ct. at 2359-60.
52 The Internal Revenue Service has no authority to enforce its own summons but
must rely on the courts to do so. See I.R.C. § 7402(b).
98 S. Ct. at 2360 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 77).
98 S. Ct. at 2359 (citation omitted).
" Id. at 2359-60 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 2360 (citation omitted). These allegations were necessary to meet the Powell
criteria for enforcement of a summons. See text accompanying note 30 supra. The allega-
tions as to a civil purpose, however, were discounted by the district court. See 98 S. Ct.
at 2360-61 (by implication).
11 98 S. Ct. at 2361.
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the improper purpose dictum from Reisman v. Caplin,5 and the
two-prong test of Donaldson v. United States,"9 the court held
that when an Internal Revenue Service investigation focuses upon
a criminal prosecution as its end goal, a summons issued in aid
of such investigation is not in good faith, even though no formal
recommendation for prosecution has been made. 0 The lower
court therefore refused to enforce the summonses.
On the grounds that the district court's finding of sole crimi-
nal purpose was one of fact which was not clearly erroneous and
that such finding was consistent with the legal test articulated in
Donaldson, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of enforce-
ment.6 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the case on the grounds that the lower courts had not
applied the proper legal standard for determining whether an
investigation is conducted solely for criminal purposes. 2
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court specifically in-
tended to resolve the conflicts over the meaning of the Donaldson
test as applied to the criminal purpose defense . 3 Its decision
leaves no doubt that the test is bifurcated and that both elements
apply when the issue of improper criminal purpose is raised. 4 The
determinative point in time contemplated by the test is when the
formal recommendation for criminal prosecution is made by the
Internal Revenue Service to the Justice Department. 5 Prior to
such recommendation, the test is one of institutional good faith.
Relying on isolated provisions of the present Internal Reve-
nue Code, 7 the historical precursors of the summons power,6" and
375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964). See text accompanying note 26 supra.
" 400 U.S. 517. 536 (1971). See text accompanying note 39 supra.
' United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,072, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-
1239, 76-1240 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2357
(1978).
' 554 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1977).
,2 98 S. Ct. at 2368 n.21.
3 Id. at 2357, 2359, 2362.
" Id. at 2365-66, 2367 n.18, 2368 n.19.
65 Id. at 2365.
" Id. at 2367-68 & n.19.
I7 ld. at 2363. The significant provisions provide for civil and criminal penalties for
tax fraud. The civil penalty is considered to be a tax liability. See I.R.C. §§ 6653(b),
6659(a), 7206.
" 98 S. Ct. at 2364 & n.14. The Court noted that the 1939 Code explicitly authorized
use of the summons power to investigate fraud. It further noted that use of the summons
in conjunction with fraud investigations has been allowed since 1864.
1979
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the organizational structure of the Service, 9 the Court reiterated
the dual purpose doctrine: the civil and criminal purposes of
section 7602 are inherently inseparable by Congressional design.70
Thus, reasoned the Court, it necessarily follows that any investi-
gation into possible criminal tax violations has an underlying
civil purpose (the determination of the applicability of the 50%
civil tax penalty) unless and until the Internal Revenue Service
abandons or otherwise completely settles the tax penalty issue."
Even the fact that a criminal case is being prosecuted by the
Justice Department does not dispose of the civil aspects of the
investigation.7 2 Thus, prohibiting use of the summons after a rec-
ommendation to the Justice Department is not mandated by the
dual purpose analysis: it is a precautionary measure imposed by
the Court to preserve the traditional accusatory function of the
grand jury and to prevent circumvention of the limitations placed
on the government's discovery rights in a criminal proceeding.73
The dual purpose analysis, however, is the underlying prem-
ise of the Court's refusal to allow the summons to be used in aid
of a solely criminal investigation. The good faith test is met only
if it is determined that the summons was issued in honest pursuit
1, Id. at 2363 n.12. The Court's point in reviewing the organizational structure of the
Service was that special agents are not only responsible for criminal investigations but
also for civil fraud violations of the Code.
70 Id. at 2363.
u Id. at 2365.
72 Id.
11 Id. Since their original articulation in O'Connor, these are the only reasons cited
for refusal to enforce a summons when a criminal prosecution is pending. See United
States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1978).
None of the cases include any analysis of the comparative scope of the Internal
Revenue Service summons power and the grand jury subpoena power or the Justice De-
partment's expanded pretrial discovery rights in criminal cases. The premise, however,
is that constitutional safeguards exist in the latter contexts which do not apply to adminis-
trative agency summonses. Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960) (dictum).
The Court has, however, analogized the scope of the IRS summons power to that of the
grand jury. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (dictum). Nevertheless, the
Court has consistently stated that administrative agency summons power may not be used
solely for criminal purposes. Conversely, the grand jury subpoena power may not be used
as a subterfuge to gather evidence solely for civil proceedings. Compare United States v.
Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970) (dictum) with United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
356 U.S. 677, 683-84 (1958).
For the scope of the government's pretrial discovery, see Moore, CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY, 19 HASTINGS L. J. 865 (1968); Note, PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY
UNDER PROPOSED RULE 16, 85 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1972). For role of the grand jury
in tax cases, see Morvillo, Grand Juries and Their Use in Criminal Tax Controversies,
N.Y.U. 35TH ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX. 249 (1977).
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of a statutorily-authorized purpose.7" Section 7602 on its face lim-
its use of the summons to determination and collection of civil
tax.75 While the interrelated civil and criminal tax enforcement
provisions of the Code imply that the summons may be used
when a dual purpose exists, there is no authority for such use if
the civil tax element disappears altogether. Absent an express,
affirmative grant of such authority, the Court would not permit
the summons to be used exclusively for criminal purposes."
While theoretically preserving the criminal purpose defense
prior to a recommendation for prosecution, the Court acknowl-
edged that it would seldom have any practical applicability be-
cause a solely criminal investigation would be "an extraordinary
departure from the normally inseparable goals of examining
whether the basis exists for criminal charges and for the assess-
ment of civil penalties."77 The Court rejected the argument that
such a departure may be established by probing the subjective
intent of the issuing agent.78 By referring to the standard proce-
dures set forth in the Internal Revenue Service Manual for re-
viewing a special agent's recommendation,7 the Court concluded
that the motives of the special agent do not substantially deter-
mine the ultimate outcome of the investigation. In the Court's
opinion, the established bureaucratic process provides the tax-
payer with sufficient protection from the poor judgment of the
investigating agent. 0
The Court underscored its decision with two policy consider-
ations: (1) the legitimate tax enforcement function of the Service
7, 98 S. Ct. at 2367.
7' See note 3 supra.
7' 98 S. Ct. at 2367 n.18.
Id. at 2366.
Id. at 2367. The Court specifically noted, however, that the subjective intent of the
agent may be important where other issues of bad faith are raised such as harrassment.
Id. at 2367 n.17. For extraordinary circumstances under which bad faith harassment may
be alleged, see United States v. Fensterwald, 553 F.2d 231, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (taxpayer
previously served as counsel to senate committee investigating the IRS); United States
v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 822, 825 (9th Cir. 1975) (allegations of harassment
were not sufficient to allow immediate discovery but were enough to require a limited
hearing to determine if discovery should be allowed).
"' 98 S. Ct. at 2366-67. Even if a special agent recommends criminal prosecution, that
decision is not made final until it has been reviewed by supervisors on at least two different
levels within the Service. In addition, the possibility that the Service will pursue penalties
for civil fraud remains.
" Id. at 2367.
1979
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should not be obstructed by the personal motivation of one lower-
echelon employee; and (2) judicial inquiry into the mental pro-
cesses of individual agents would result in unwarranted delay in
the enforcement procedures."
In lieu of a subjective test, LaSalle shifts the focus of inquiry
into improper criminal purpose at the pre-recommendation stage
to the institutional policies of the agency. Thus the issue is
whether the Service, as an institution, has abandoned these poli-
cies in the particular investigation. The burden is on the party
opposing the summons to show such an abandonment. In particu-
lar, the Court expressly imposed upon those parties the onerous
burden of proving a negative: that there is no valid civil tax
purpose to the summons. 2
Although the Court thus severely restricted the criminal pur-
pose objection, it addressed a stern warning to the Service:
We shall not countenance delay in submitting a recommendation to
the Justice Department when there is an institutional commitment
to make the referral and the Service merely would like to gather
additional evidence for the prosecution. Such a delay would be tan-
tamount to the use of the summons authority after the recommenda-
tion .... Similarly, the good-faith standard will not permit the
IRS to become an information gathering agency for other depart-
ments, including the Department of Justice, regardless of the status
of criminal cases.Y
In a brief but stinging opinion, four dissenting justices casti-
gated the position of the majority." The dissent found no valid
statutory or constitutional reason for imposing the good faith
requirement on the use of an Internal Revenue Service summons
for criminal investigation purposes. Instead, the only standard
acceptable to the dissent was the objective test enunciated in
Donaldson. Thus the sole question should be whether the sum-
mons was issued prior to a recommendation for prosecution. If so,
the summons should be enforced without regard to any inquiry
into its civil or criminal purposes. From the dissent's perspective,
the institutional good faith test is untenable: its end result will






INSTITUTIONAL GOOD FAITH TEST
which will unduly interfere with the legitimate tax enforcement
duties of the Service.8 5
IV. THE SOUNDNESS OF THE RATIONALE
The Court's use of the language of section 7602, the legisla-
tive history, and the internal organization of the Service to re-
solve the issue of improper criminal purpose is entirely consistent
with its approach to any issue of the scope of an administrative
agency's summons power: the point of departure is always the
statutorily-authorized purpose.0 If a summons is issued within
the parameters of the statute, it will generally be enforced.
Although commentators have vociferously criticized the
Court's dual purpose analysis, 7 it may be argued that Congress
has at least acquiesced in this interpretation. In the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Congress specifically reacted to the Court's holding
in Donaldson that a taxpayer could not intervene in an enforce-
ment proceeding as a matter of right 8 Notably absent from the
comprehensive provisions of the Act was any change in the lan-
guage of section 7602 which would have evidenced any disagree-
ment with the Court's determination that a summons could be
issued in aid of an investigation of criminal tax violations so long
as it retained a valid civil tax purpose. Furthermore, in the legis-
lative history of the Act, there is no indication that Congress
disapproved of the prohibition against using the summons solely
Sd. at 2369. But see text accompanying notes 99-105 infra.
" In the leading Supreme Court case concerning the scope of administrative agency
summons power, the Court said: "It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully
authorized purpose, within the power of Congress to command." Oklahoma Press Pub.
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946) (dictum). For a general discussion of the scope of
administrative agency subpoena powers, including the IRS, see 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, J.
GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 19.02-20.05 (1979). For an analysis of the IRS summons
power in the context of the leading administrative law cases, see Miller, supra note 32, at
668-78.
11 See Van Wert, supra note 6, at 435-36; Kramon, supra note 4, at 635-36; Duke,
Prosecution For Attempts To Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedural
Hybrid,76 YALE L.J. 1, 34-38, 42-44 (1966).
" See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 307-09, reprinted in [1976] 4 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3202-06; S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 368-70,
reprinted in 119761 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3797-99.
Congress added I.R.C. § 7609(b) which gives a taxpayer the right to intervene in a
summons enforcement proceeding and to stay compliance by a third party. These provi-
sions apply only when a summons is issued to certain third parties: banks, savings and
loan associations, credit unions, credit card issuers, stock brokers, attorneys, and accoun-
tants. See I.R.C. § 7609(a). These changes in the Code, however, would not alter the result
in Donaldson where a summons is issued to an employer. See 400 U.S. 517, 518-19 (1971).
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for criminal purposes. In fact, the Committee reports explicitly
indicate that Congress did not intend to affect the substantive
defenses of the taxpayer against enforcement of the summons,
although the taxpayer-intervenor may now raise certain proce-
dural defenses previously reserved to the third party.8'
The Court's stated rationale for refusal to consider the spe-
cial agent's subjective intent is not so easily supported. The
agent's investigation is more than a cursory examination of the
facts to determine the possibility of fraud. Its function is to de-
velop sufficient evidence to determine whether criminal prosecu-
tion is warranted.'0 Although multiple layers of review exist, the
purpose of that review is to determine the adequacy of the known
facts to support a legal theory of fraud." If at any stage of the
review process the facts are deemed insufficient, the criminal
investigation is not necessarily dropped. The case may instead be
returned to the agent for further investigation.'
2
It is difficult to perceive any protection for the taxpayer from
the overzealousness of a special agent in this procedure. If his
subjective intent may not be probed, any experienced agent with
a passing knowledge of the case law in this area will conduct a
" The taxpayer may now attach a third-party summons on the basis of ambiguity,
vagueness, and irrelevance. The taxpayer, however, is still precluded from raising defenses
which affect the third-party's interests only, such as improper service of process or undue
burden or expense. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 309, reprinted in [19761
4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3205; S. REp. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. at 370-
71, reprinted in [19761 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3800.
When a summons is attacked on procedural grounds, the result is rarely complete
denial of enforcement. Instead, the courts tend to narrow the scope of the inquiry and/or
require the government to reimburse the respondent. Note, IRS SUBPOENA POWER TO
INVESTIGATE UNKNOWN TAXPAYERS, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 177, 179-85 (1975). See
Note, IRS ACCESS TO BANK RECORDS; PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS INADMIN-
ISTRATIVE SUBPOENA POWER, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 270-71 (1976); Constraints on
the Administrative Summons Power of the Internal Revenue Service, 63 IowA L. REv. 526,
531-33 (1977). The latter remedy has apparently been superseded by a new provision in
the Internal Revenue Code providing for reimbursement of the reasonable costs incurred
in complying with a third-party summons. See I.R.C. § 7610(a).
,0 See, 5 INT. REV. MAN. - AD. (CCH) §§ 9311.1(1), .2(1), .2(3), at 28,075-76 (3-79);
Galen, Discovery and Privilege in Tax Cases; What to do When the Special Agent Arrives,
28 S. CAL. TAx INST. 833, 838-39 (1976).
" Bacon, How IRS views the practitioner's role in its criminal enforcement program,
34 J.TAx. 198, 200 (1971); 13 AM. JUR. TRIALS 2 Defending Federal Tax Evasion Cases §§
12-13, 15 (1967).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 623-24 (3d Cir. 1975); Bacon, supra
note 91 at 200.
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meticulous investigation before he makes a recommendation for
prosecution . 3
The policy considerations cited by the Court to bolster its
argument are likewise subject to criticism. The viability of the
tax system may hinge upon swift and efficient enforcement which
will not tolerate obstructive or dilatory tactics by the taxpayer,
but it is not the taxpayer's motives which are at issue in this case.
Why should the taxpayer suffer an unnecessary invasion of his
privacy with the concomitant probability of damage to his busi-
ness and personal reputations merely because the special agent's
investigation retains some trace of a valid civil tax purpose? The
more reasonable approach would have been to place the responsi-
bility for frustration of the legitimate goals of the Service squarely
on its own shoulders when one of its employees acts imprudently.
The occasional inability of the Service to build a criminal or civil
fraud case against a taxpayer might have had the laudable effect
of containing hasty, ill-advised investigations before the taxpayer
sustained any irreversible damage.
While expediency was the articulated basis for the restriction
on judicial inquiry into the subjective intent of the special agent,
it may be noted that the courts have been consistently reluctant
to probe into the thought processes of administrative agency deci-
sionmakers absent an absolute necessity to do so." The mental
processes privilege, originally formulated by the Supreme Court
in the context of judicial review of formal agency actions, has
been extended by the lower courts to informal decisions as well.
In particular, the privilege has been held to bar taxpayer access
to Internal Revenue Service documents which relate to the purely
deliberative processes of agency personnel 5 and to allow an agent
to refuse to answer questions concerning his mental impressions,
conclusions, and opinions. 6
93 Agents are well informed of the practical ramifications of the court decisions on the
conduct of investigations. It is obviously in the best interest of the Service to update its
directives t6 the agents so that investigatory methods maximize the information-gathering
powers granted by the courts. See 5 INT. REV. MAN. - AD. §§ 261-267.51, at 28,801-06 (12-
78).
"' United States v. Morgan (Morgan IV), 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941). But see Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420-21 (1971) (limits the mental
processes privilege of Morgan if necessary to prevent abuse of the court's process).
" Weir Foundation v. United States, 508 F.2d 894, 895 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974). But see
Pierson v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 384, 392 (D. Del. 1977) (mental processes privilege
does not apply to documents).
" ISI Corporation v. United States, 503 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1974).
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V. THE INSTITUTIONAL GOOD FAITH TEST
The Supreme Court cited no authority for its conclusion that
the proper legal standard must be based upon the good faith of
the Service as an institution. Thus, the conceptual origins of the
institutional good faith test are unknown. The idea of institu-
tional good faith, however, is a logical corollary of the theory of
institutional decisions articulated by Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis in his treatise on administrative law: "Decisions are and
must be anonymous, for they are in truth an institutional prod-
uct. The superior officers never see the bulk of the cases, but the
cases reflect the views of those officers through their instruction
and supervision and advice and check, and sometimes through
their direct consideration."' 7
The institutional good faith test is arguably an objective
standard. As an analytical methodology for determining whether
a summons issued prior to a recomendation for prosecution is for
an improper criminal purpose, it is a relatively simple approach.
As a point of departure, it requires the courts to refer to the
established rules, regulations, and internal procedures of the
Service. The posture of the agency in a particular case must then
be measured against applicable institutional guidelines. If the
Service has substantially deviated from its standard procedures
or arbitrarily disregarded existing rules or regulations, the court
may conclude that the summons was issued in bad faith."
The simplicity of the approach is deceptive, however, be-
cause the Court left one major question unanswered: How is the
institutional posture of the Service to be determined? If the test
is intended to be objective, then the answer must be that the
position of the Service is ascertainable from its records: the spe-
cial agent's notes and reports, correspondence in the taxpayer's
file, internal memoranda, and the like. This is precisely what may
have prompted the dissent to express concern that the majority's
approach would lead to "endless discovery proceedings.' '
, 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.07 (1st ed. 1958).
" Cf. Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 867-78
(D.D.C. 1973) (taxpayer entitled to refund and injunctive relief compelling IRS to grant
an exemption from tax). Shultz is an excellent example of the analytical methodology
suggested by the institutional good faith test of LaSalle. The district court painstakingly
compared the manner in which the taxpayer's request for an exemption was handled by
the IRS at all levels with the applicable regulations, procedures, and rulings published
by the IRS.
" 98 S. Ct. at 2369.
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The lower courts, however, have severely restricted the dis-
covery rights of the taxpayer in enforcement proceedings.' 0 While
some disagreement exists, the prevalent attitude is that an en-
forcement proceeding is summary in nature.1'0 Unless the tax-
payer raises a substantial question that the summons has been
issued for an improper criminal purpose, the courts have gener-
ally denied any discovery. 02 Mere allegations of improper purpose
are not enough: the pleadings must be supported by sufficient
facts from which improper purpose may be inferred. 0 3 If the tax-
payer cannot meet this threshold requirement, the summons is
enforced. To determine the sufficiency of the supporting facts,
some courts have determined that a limited evidentiary hearing
should be held prior to discovery by the taxpayer or third party.0 4
Even if the facts cast suspicion upon the motivation of the Serv-
ice, where the court determines that discovery would serve no
useful purpose, the taxpayer has been denied access to the agency
files. o5
By requiring the taxpayer to disprove the existence of any
valid civil tax purpose, the Supreme Court effectively foreclosed
the possibility of discovery in the ordinary case. Unless the tax-
payer already possesses firm facts to indicate that no civil tax
penalty could attach under any circumstances, he will be unable
to meet the threshold requirements. Thus, the only time he could
have access to the information he needs to establish institutional
bad faith would be when he doesn't need that information at all.
Assuming arguendo that the taxpayer gets by the discovery
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Salter,
432 F.2d 697, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1970). Authority to limit discovery derives from FED. R. Civ.
P. 81(a)(3).
101 E.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 529 (1971); United States v.
Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. McCarthy, 514
F.2d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 1975) (dictum). See generally Kramon, supra note 4, at 630-31.
'0 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 42-43 & n.3 (2d
Cir. 1978); United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972).
"0 See, e.g., United States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1970). But see Pierson v. United States,
428 F. Supp. 384, 390 (D. Del. 1977) (taxpayer may obtain discovery upon a showing of
relevance unless documents or information sought is subsequently determined to be privi-
leged).
'" See, e.g., United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 372-73 (3d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700 (1970). But see United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d
165, 169 (5th Cir. 1971).
' United States v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D. Vt. 1970).
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barrier, the probability of the records revealing an abandonment
of the civil fraud penalty is virtually nil. Knowing that it must
preserve some trace of potential civil tax liability in order to use
the summons power for criminal investigation purposes, the Serv-
ice has no incentive to abandon the possibility of collecting that
penalty. While the statute of limitations for assessment of ordi-
nary tax deficiencies is three years, there is no limitation for
collection of taxes due in case of fraud, willful attempt to evade
taxes, or failure to file a return.'"0 In contrast, the limitation for
prosecution of criminal tax violations is six years. 07 Thus in any
case in which fraud is suspected, the standard procedure is to set
aside the civil aspects of the case until the criminal investigation
is completed.'"8 Even if the investigation fails to uncover suffi-
cient evidence to sustain a criminal conviction, the possibility of
civil tax fraud remains because of the differences in the burden
of proof the government must meet.' °9 Under the circumstances
it is difficult to imagine any situation in which the Service would
entirely dispose of the civil tax issue before completion of the
special agent's investigation into potential criminal liability."0
VI. CONCLUSION
For all practical purposes the LaSalle decision limits the
criminal purpose defense to post-recommendation cases. Except
in extraordinary situations, the court's inquiry need go no further
than determination of one fact: Has there been a formal recom-
mendation of prosecution from the Internal Revenue Service to
the Justice Department? For the ordinary taxpayer facing a crim-
inal tax investigation, the burden of disproving the existence of
any civil tax liability makes the institutional good faith test illu-
sory.
Jos I.R.C. §§ 6501(a), 6501(c).
I" ld. § 6531.
' See, e.g., 5 INT. REv. MAN. - AD. (CCH) § 9324.31, at 28,082-83 (11-78).
'" The government need only show civil fraud by clear and convincing proof whereas
criminal fraud must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Comment, Civil Tax
Penalties: Changes and Recommendations, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 465, 486 (1978).
110 There may be two circumstances under which the civil tax issues might be deemed
completely settled: (1) the taxpayer and the IRS have entered into a closing agreement
allowing the IRS to collect a deficiency after the statute of limitations has expired in
return for dropping the fraud penalty; or (2) the taxpayer has protested assessment of an
alleged deficiency in court proceedings, the IRS raised a defense of fraud, and the taxpayer
won. See Nash, Effective Internal Revenue Service Appellate Division Practice, N.Y.U.
35TH ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX. 325, 342-43, 345 (1977).
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If the good faith element of the Donaldson test provides no
viable protection for the taxpayer, why did the majority insist
that it is applicable when the issue of sole criminal purpose is
raised? Beyond its concern with the possibility of delay at the
higher levels of review merely to build a stronger case against the
taxpayer, the Court unequivocally put the Service on notice that
it would not tolerate abuse of the legitimate summons power for
non-tax purposes. The Court thus implicitly recognized the inher-
ent danger in allowing the Internal Revenue Service to use its
summons power to gather information for other agencies. With
financial overtones to virtually every private endeavor, the Serv-
ice is in a unique position to act as a central data collection
agency for the rest of the government. With no good faith limit
on the summons power, it could be used to circumvent the statu-
tory and constitutional limitations placed on other agencies by
Congress and the Court.
While the institutional good faith test severely restricts the
utility of the criminal purpose defense, the Court's tenacious re-
fusal to dispense with this requirement may be viewed as a com-
promise between the legitimate criminal tax enforcement func-
tion of the Service and the dangers of an unlimited summons
power. By retaining the good faith element-albeit in an ambigu-
ous, elusive form-the Court reserved the right to invoke the
doctrine as deemed necessary in the future to prevent gross
abuses of the summons power solely for the purpose of criminal
prosecution."'
Dorothy J. Cramer
lu 98 S. Ct. at 2368 n.20.
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